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Abstract: The revival of Russian military power poses certain challenges to NATO and to the West. However, the exact nature of
these challenges is not straightforward. This article discusses why
Russia is reviving its conventional military power and argues these
developments are not limited to the intention of preparing for offensive action. NATO’s and the West’s policy responses to recent
changes in Russian defense policy need to be based on a realistic and
nuanced understanding of Russian motivations because ill-considered responses could have serious unintended consequences.

A

fter almost 20 years of allowing Russia’s conventional armed
forces to fall into disrepair, an extensive program of modernization announced in 2008 has yielded impressive results and
started a process of Russian military revival.1 Following the military
intervention in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and Russia’s first
expeditionary operation outside of the former Soviet region in Syria,
recent developments in Russian defense policy have led to increasing
concerns about a militarily resurgent Russia and the potential implications of this for its neighbors, NATO, and the West. In the words of the
new NATO SACEUR, US General Curtis Scaparotti, who was sworn in
in May 2016, “a resurgent Russia [is] striving to project itself as a world
power…To address these challenges, we must continue to maintain and
enhance our levels of readiness and our agility in the spirit of being able
to fight tonight if deterrence fails.”2
According to Gustav Gressel, writing for the European Council
of Foreign Relations, “Europe’s military advantage over Russia” is
now “undermined.” To counter “Russia’s new military boldness and
adventurism” and its military vision that is “centered on the Eurasian
landmass,” Europe is now in need of finding an urgent response to
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“Russian expansionism.” Although “a major military escalation on the
European continent is not imminent,” according to Gressel, “Russia is
clearly preparing itself for offensive operations.”3
Russia’s conventional military capabilities are more impressive
today than during the first two decades of the post-Soviet period, and
these capabilities are likely to continue growing. It is also beyond doubt
Russian foreign policy rhetoric and conduct today, particularly towards
NATO and the West, is more forceful and aggressive than it was at any
time during the post-Cold war era. However, the convergence of these
factors does not necessarily mean Russia is rebuilding its conventional
military exclusively to prepare for more offensive action or to pursue
expansionist policies in direct confrontation with NATO.
This article argues this conjecture overlooks the fact that most states
continue to see the maintenance of a powerful conventional military
as essential. Conventional military power has remained highly relevant
throughout the post-Cold war era not only as an instrument of policy,
but also as an essential attribute of a strong state and global actor. From
this point of view, Russia’s restoration of conventional military power
was only a matter of time and money and is in many ways less surprising
than the long neglect of these capabilities. Moreover, the assumption
that preparation for offensive action and the pursuit of expansionist
policies is the only motivation behind the revival of Russia’s conventional military power disregards the fact that the utility of military force
is not limited to the fighting of wars and defeating of opponents.
Instead, conventional military power is routinely wielded to deter,
compel, swagger, dissuade, or reassure. The idea that improvements in
Russia’s conventional military capabilities have significantly increased
the likelihood of offensive action, including against the West, also
underestimates the limitations of Russia’s conventional military capabilities and overstates its likely willingness to take such a step in the
first place. Theoretically, the scenario of a Russian offensive against a
NATO member state is not impossible now or in the future, but it would
be highly irrational given Russia’s persistent disparity in conventional
military power and the risk of escalation into nuclear conflict. The
revival of Russian conventional military power will increasingly affect
the defensive balance in Europe and pose certain challenges. However,
the implications of this development and how NATO and the West
should respond are not straightforward. A more nuanced consideration
of Russia’s possible motivations for rebuilding its conventional military
power is essential. Basing policy responses on a skewed understanding
of Russian intentions could have serious unintended consequences.

The Enduring Relevance of Conventional Military Power

A strong military is central to a state’s ability to project power on
an international level. As Hans Morgenthau noted, as long as anarchy
obtains in the international system, “armed strength as a threat or a
potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political
3      Gustav Gressel, “Russia’s Quiet Military Revolution and What It Means for Europe,” European
Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief 143 (October 12, 2015): 1 and 13, http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/russias_quiet_military_revolution_and_what_it_means_for_europe4045 (accessed
February 8, 2016).
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power of nations.”4 Arguably, this is as true today as it was at the time
this line was written. During the Cold War, strong conventional military
power, in addition to nuclear deterrence, singled out the United States
and the Soviet Union as the world’s two superpowers. Although some
advocates of nuclear weapons believed nuclear deterrence would make
conventional military power obsolete in the long run, such a view never
took hold in the superpowers’ defense decision-making establishments.
In fact, both countries continued spending the bulk of their military
budgets on conventional forces because it was understood the politicalmilitary utility of nuclear deterrence was limited for dealing with threats
to their interests below the threshold of a direct nuclear attack on their
own territories.5
When the Cold War ended, many believed the centrality of military
power in international relations would diminish. The dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the threat of a global conflict had waned and, with the
spread of democracy and economic interdependence, state competition
in the future would revolve around economic, not military matters.6
However, such beliefs were short-lived. Military power continued to be
seen as an essential instrument of statecraft, especially for great powers,
even though economic competition had become more important and
there was no longer an immediate threat of a global war.7 In the absence
of an immediate adversary against whom to assess its conventional military capabilities, the United States defined the “two-war” standard as a
measure to size its conventional forces in 1991. As there was no clear and
present danger emanating from a specific state actor, conventional forces
strong enough to deal with the eventuality of two simultaneous major
regional contingencies were considered essential to ensure the country’s
“ongoing demands for forward presence, crisis response, regional deterrence, humanitarian assistance, building partnership capacity, homeland
defense, and support to civil authorities.”8
Contemporary China is another important example demonstrating
the enduring relevance of conventional military power in the eyes of
states aspiring to great power status. Although China has established
itself as one of the world’s economic great powers, growing economic
strength has been accompanied by a massive drive to establish a competitive conventional military arsenal. As the world’s second largest
military spender behind the United States, and with its budget continuing to grow, China’s development has evoked discussions similar
to the Russian case about the country’s intentions and its potential
transformation into a “revisionist state.”9 As Hew Strachan has noted,
4      Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th Edition (New York,
NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 29.
5      Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980):
21; and Gary L. Guertner, Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College, 1992), 1-2.
6      Robert J. Art, “American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force,” Security Studies 5, no.
4 (1996): 7.
7      Ibid., 8-9.
8      Daniel Goure, PhD, “The Measure of a Superpower: A Two Major Regional Contingency
Military for the 21st Century," The Heritage Foundation Special Report #128, January 25, 2013, 1, http://
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/the-measure-of-superpower-a-two-major-regionalcontingency-military-for-21-century (accessed May 19, 2016).
9      Wei-chin Lee, “Long Shot and Short Hit: China as a Military Power and Its Implications for
the USA and Taiwan,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 43, no. 5 (October 2008): 524.
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rather than causing a decline of the role of conventional military power
in international politics, the end of the Cold War made permissible a
situation where states, especially in the West, have displayed a growing
readiness to use military force as an instrument of policy.10 The utility
of conventional military power endures.

Russia and Conventional Military Power

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia always maintained a strong nuclear deterrent, and in this area remained equal to the
United States. However, its conventional forces were left to decay for
almost two decades. This drawn-out neglect of its armed forces should
not be confused with a statement of pacifism in the sense that the projection of military power was no longer seen as important.
Russia’s quest for great power status dates back centuries, and its
self-perception as such did not cease with the end of the Cold War in
1991.11 Military power was central to the making of the tsarist empire. It
was also a strong military, above all else, which elevated the Soviet Union
to superpower status during the Cold War years. Relinquishing armed
strength and accepting the resulting loss of great power status was never
a serious option for Russia. The first military doctrine of the Russian
Federation issued in 1993 envisaged significant cuts to Soviet legacy
force levels and prioritized the development of conventional forces able
to deal with local conflicts, which were seen as the most immediate
concern at the time. The idea that a global conventional deterrent was no
longer needed was never a consensus view in Russia. Traditional military
thinkers from the outset argued in favor of more open-ended defense
requirements that would keep the country prepared for a larger variety
of eventualities.12
In fact, the 1993 doctrine already reflected ambitions to maintain a
competitive conventional deterrent. It envisioned investments in research
and development for the creation of high-tech equipment, including
electronic warfare capabilities, stealth technology, and advanced naval
weaponry. This was a direct response to the lessons Russian strategists
had learned from the accomplishments of the “revolution in military
affairs” demonstrated by superior US conventional forces in the 1991
Gulf War.13 Such ambitions were confirmed in the 2000 military doctrine, which explicitly reoriented priorities away from the focus on small
wars-type scenarios and towards the need for the creation of conventional forces with global reach. This doctrine was published in the wake
of NATO’s high-tech operation “Allied Force” over Serbia which, in the
words of Alexei Arbatov, “marked a watershed in Russia’s assessment of
its own military requirements and defense priorities.”14
10      Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 22.
11      Iver B. Neumann, “Russia as a Great Power, 1815-2007,” Journal of International Relations and
Development 11, no. 2 (June 2008).
12      Alexei G. Arbatov, “The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned
from Kosovo and Chechnya,” The Marshall Center Papers, no. 2, (June 2000): 7, http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/mcPapers/mc-paper_2-en.pdf
(accessed October 12 2015).
13      Richard Pipes, “Is Russia Still an Enemy?” Foreign Affairs 76 no. 5 (September/October
1997): 75-76.
14      Arbatov, “The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine,” 8-9.
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Although the central components of the successful 2008 modernization program, such as the need to professionalize, create rapid
reaction forces, and procure advanced technology, were considered in
all reform attempts from the early 1990s, no program up until 2008 led
to fundamental transformation. Unlike the 2008 reforms, which were
backed up by realistic financial means and unprecedented political will,
Yeltsin-era plans for military transformation faltered owing to the country’s dire economic situation and the lack of political clout required for
pushing through changes unpopular with some elements in the military
leadership.15 The inability to turn ambitions for its conventional military
into reality did not mean the Russian leadership no longer saw strong
conventional military power as desirable or important. Clearly, there was
an understanding that a strong nuclear deterrent alone was insufficient
to uphold Russia’s great power status in the long term, especially when
other countries’ conventional armed forces continued to modernize
at a rapid pace. Conventional military power persists as an important
attribute of state power. It is deemed to have utility as an instrument of
policy, even more so now than it was during the Cold War. As long as
this is the case, it would be unrealistic to expect Russia not to want to
remain a player in the game.

The Utility of Conventional Military Power

The idea that the modernization of Russia’s conventional military
capabilities can only be motivated by its intention to engage in ever more
aggressive, expansionist, and offensive military action is based on a simplistic understanding of the utility of conventional military power. As
Robert Art argued, “military power should not be equated simply with
its physical use…To focus only on the physical use of military power is
to miss most of what most states do most of the time with the military
power at their disposal.”16 In other words, states maintain conventional
military forces not only to fight offensive wars, but also to wield these
forces in a variety of physical and non-physical ways to deter, coerce,
compel, swagger, reassure, or dissuade other actors, depending on the
situation and on the objectives to be achieved.17
The prerequisite for a state’s ability to use its military power in
any physical or non-physical way is the availability of a robust military
organization in the first place. Following the serious neglect of the
Russian armed forces throughout the 1990s, this availability was increasingly in doubt. The degree of decay of the Russian military and the
possible domestic and international repercussions if this situation had
been allowed to continue need to be taken into account when Russia’s
reasons for rebuilding its conventional military power are considered.
As Eugene Rumer and Celeste Wallander wrote in 2003, “Russia entered
the millennium with its capacity to project military power beyond its
borders vastly reduced and its ability to defend its territorial integrity

15      Alexei G. Arbatov, “Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects,”
International Security 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 112-113.
16      Art, “American Foreign Policy,” 10.
17      Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” and John F. Troxell, “Military Power and the Use of
Force” in US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: Volume 1: Theory of War and Strategy,
5th Edition, ed. J. Boones Bartholomees Jr. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012): 217-241.
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and sovereignty severely tested by the war in Chechnya.”18 Clearly, the
fact that the once powerful Russian military struggled to defeat “a band
of irregulars fighting with little more than the weapons on their backs,”
as Jeffrey Tayler had put it, created a feeling of insecurity in Russia that
cast serious doubts on its ability to defend against and deter potential
external threats.19
Although a stronger Russian conventional military poses certain
challenges to NATO and the West, it is clear further decay would have
been a poor alternative. When the Russian National Security Concept
issued in 2000 permitted nuclear first use to “repulse armed aggression,
if all other means of resolving the crisis have been exhausted,” it was
widely assumed the nuclear threshold was lowered because there was
no longer any faith in Russia that conventional options would be successful in the case of an armed attack.20 As Charles Glaser cautioned,
there is the danger that insecurity can pressure an adversary to adopt
competitive and threatening policies.21 This is particularly dangerous if
the only tools available for pursuing such policies are nuclear weapons.
It is also clear the modernization of Russia’s conventional military was a
necessity not only to ensure defense requirements. Although a military
coup was never on the cards, concerns over growing military opposition
and mutiny became increasingly common by the end of the 1990s.22 The
potentially catastrophic consequences of this for Russia, as well as for
international security, are not hard to imagine.
Russian views on the utility of conventional military power are not
limited to territorial defense and the peaceful deterrence of potential
external threats. After all, Russia has used armed force to pursue a
variety of policy objectives throughout the post-Cold War years, including various “peace enforcement” operations across the former Soviet
region at the beginning of the 1990s, the Chechen wars, the war with
Georgia in 2008, in Ukraine starting in 2014, and most recently in
Syria. A reason why there is concern in the West about improvements in
Russia’s conventional military capabilities is the conviction that better
capabilities will inevitably lead to more offensive action in the future.
As British expert on the Russian military Keir Giles has put it, “the
more Russia develops its conventional capability, the more confident and
aggressive it will become.”23 The influence of capabilities on the decision
to use force is not as straightforward, however. As Benjamin Fordham
argued, the “claim that capabilities influence not just opportunity, but
also willingness…is implicit or explicit in a substantial amount of work
in international relations, but has rarely been tested.”24
18      Eugene B. Rumer and Celeste A. Wallander, “Russia: Power in Weakness?” The Washington
Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2003): 61.
19      Jeffrey Tayler, “Russia is Finished,” The Atlantic, May 2001, http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2001/05/russia-is-finished/302220/ (accessed May 21, 2016).
20      Celeste A. Wallander, “Wary of the West: Russian Security Policy at the Millennium,” Arms
Control Today 30, no. 2 (March 2000): 11.
21      Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,”
Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 82-83.
22      Arbatov, “Military Reform,” 103 and 129.
23      Keir Giles, Russia’s New ‘Tools’ for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s
Exercise of Power (London, UK: Chatham House, March 2016), 2, https://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-03-21-russias-new-tools-giles.pdf (accessed
April 2, 2016).
24      Benjamin O. Fordham, “A Very Sharp Sword: The Influence of Military Capabilities on
American Decisions to Use Force,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (October 2004): 633.
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Better military capabilities are likely to influence Russian foreign
policy by providing more opportunity for the use of force. After all,
as Fordham also noted, “decision makers cannot use force unless they
have the means to do so.”25 Russia’s air campaign in Syria, for example,
was certainly enabled by the opportunities created from improvements
in its conventional capabilities. In Syria, Russia demonstrated it now had
the capability to deploy and sustain a limited out-of-area operation for
the first time in post-Soviet history. This came as a surprise to many
observers, who did not believe Russia had the sea and airlift capabilities
required for such an undertaking.26 This operation would not have been
possible ten years ago, even if there had been the willingness in theory
to launch a similar offensive.
The most likely area for future Russian military action continues to
be the former Soviet region in cases deemed by Russia to pose significant
threats to its interests, for example, the intrusion of IS terrorism into
Central Asian states. It is unlikely better capabilities will result in the
indiscriminate future use of military force by Russia or a proliferation of
expansionist policies as improvements in Russia’s conventional military
capabilities have not substantially changed the relative military power
balance in this region. Even at its lowest point, Russian conventional
military power far outrivalled any of the other former Soviet states, at
any point of the post-Cold War period, due to the sheer disparity in
size and the fact that their militaries were besieged by similar levels of
neglect.
Although the operational performance of Russian forces in conflicts
fought up until the Georgia war in 2008 was far from stellar, especially
when the Chechen wars stretched their capabilities in every possible
way, the country never risked a situation that could lead to comprehensive defeat. In spite of its consistent military superiority over the other
former Soviet states, Russia opted for the use of force in some cases, but
not in others even when this was expected, such as the Kyrgyz-Uzbek
clashes in 2010. Although long-term occupation and territorial expansion following the five-day war with Georgia in 2008 was within the
realm of possibility, Russia decided to withdraw.
Better conventional capabilities have created more options for the
Russian leadership to resort to the use of force. However, better capabilities per se are unlikely to cause Russia to lose sight of the fact that the
utility of military force is limited and not suited for the achievement of
every policy objective. Rationality in Russian decision-making, when
it comes to the use of force as an instrument of policy, is an important
context for the fear that improved capabilities are pursued ultimately to
prepare for offensive action against the West. This is not a new insight:
in spite of the success of the 2008 modernization program, Russian conventional military power continues to lag far behind the United States
and NATO in terms of size, spending, and technological sophistication.
This fact has been conceded even by analysts who have warned about
the dangers of a military resurgent Russia, as Gressel cited above. This
issue tends to be brushed aside, however, as disparity is merely expected
25      Ibid.
26      Dmitry Gorenburg, “What Russia’s Military Operation in Syria Can Tell Us About Advances
in its Capabilities,” PONARS Policy Memo 424, March 2016, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/
advances-russian-military-operations (accessed May 20, 2016).
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to delay the threat of Russian offensive action. It should not be. Given
the relative weakness of Russia’s conventional military vis-à-vis NATO
and the likelihood of serious escalation and defeat, a military offensive
on a NATO member state would be highly irrational. It is also far from
clear what strategic objective such a move would serve.
There is no doubt that in absolute terms Russian conventional
military capabilities in 2016 are considerably bigger and better than they
were at any point during the post-Soviet period. The achievements of
the 2008 modernization program, which emphasized the efficiency of
command structures, the move from mobilization to rapid reaction, and
the modernization of technology, have been well documented and were
demonstrated during the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.27 Relative to the
conventional military power of other great powers, the United States
and NATO in particular, Russia’s position remains far from impressive.
Although defense spending alone is insufficient as a measure of relative
military power, the sheer discrepancy in this respect is worth reiterating.
Although Russian defense spending has seen a steady increase since
Vladimir Putin’s election as president in 2000, the country’s military
budget today is still little more than 10 percent of United States mlitary
budget—and a fraction of the NATO alliance as a whole. Even when
the Russian defense budget approached five percent of the gross domestic product in 2015 at the peak of military spending, its entire budget,
inclusive of spending on nuclear capabilities, amounted to less than the
combined budgets of Germany and Italy.28
In terms of the number and quality of high-tech weaponry, Russia
continues to lag far behind Western competitors, especially the United
States. Although strides have been made in reforming the Russian
defense industry, persistent organizational problems need to be resolved
before Russia can start rivaling the West with advanced military technology. Regarding troop numbers, it is generally assumed Russian military
strength in 2015 comprised up to 800,000 personnel. This is sizeable
(even compared to the United States’ 1,400,000 active soldiers), but
the bulk of the Russian armed forces are poorly trained conscripts.29
When it comes to the combat readiness and operational experience of
Russian conventional forces relative to those of the United States, there
is little reason to fear Russia is catching up. Although Russian troops
have trained in the fighting of large-scale joint inter-service operations
in numerous military exercises in the past few years, Russia’s reformed
ground forces have never been tested in an actual conflict situation, as
both Crimea and Syria were limited in scope and scale.30
Fears over the possibility of Russian offensive action against a
NATO member state have not arisen out of the blue. Although longrange Russian bomber flights close to other countries’ airspaces resumed
in 2006 and have caused concern for a while, such instances of military
provocation continue and have risen in number. Aggressive maneuvers
27      Giles, “Russia’s New ‘Tools’,” 13-25.
28      “Chapter Ten: Country Comparisons – Commitments, Force Levels and Economics,” The
Military Balance 116, no. 1 (2016): 484-485.
29      Ibid.
30      Johan Norberg, “Training to Fight: Russia’s Major Military Exercises, 2011-2014,” Swedish
Defense Research Agency (FOI) Report, December 2015, 5, http://foi.se/rapport?rNo=FOI-R--4128-SE (accessed January 2016).
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by Russian fighter aircraft, like the buzzing of a US naval vessel in the
Baltic Sea in April 2016, have exacerbated concerns Russia was willing
to risk a military confrontation with the West. Moreover, the number
and size of Russian military exercises and surprise inspections in its
Western military district have mushroomed since the start of the 2008
modernization program. According to figures of the Russian Ministry of
Defense, some exercises have involved up to 150,000 military personnel
and have honed the country’s ability to fight a large-scale interstate war.31
It remains highly questionable whether preparation for offensive
action is the most likely motivation behind these developments. Given
the variety of possible ways in which states can wield conventional
military power to achieve different objectives, there are more plausible
explanations for Russia’s actions vis-à-vis NATO. One explanation, for
example, is that Russia is using its military power for swaggering. This
has been defined by Art as the conspicuous display by a state or statesman
of one’s military might “to look and feel more powerful or important,
to be taken seriously by others in the councils of international decisionmaking, to enhance the nation’s image in the eyes of others.”32 Clearly,
after years of decay during which the West had written off Russia as a
global military actor, such swaggering, coupled with the interventions
in Ukraine and Syria, has been an effective way to enhance the international image of Russia’s shiny, new military power in a comprehensive
manner. Given the importance for Russia of being granted great power
status on a global level, this explanation makes a great deal of sense,
as swaggering can bring prestige “on the cheap,” especially when the
country is not in the position to project the image of being a great power
by other means.33
The idea that the revival of Russian conventional military power
is motivated entirely by the wish to pursue expansionist policies and to
build the offensive potential required to defeat the West is reminiscent
of the Western school of thought that during the Cold War sought to
explain the Soviet defense effort as the result of historical Russian paranoia, aggressiveness, and “mindless lust for territory,” thus depriving
Soviet decision-making of any rationality.34 Such an interpretation of
Russian motivations and intentions is even more remarkable because the
decision to risk offensive action against a NATO state would be even
more irrational today than it was at any point during the Cold War given
the disparity of the conventional military power balance. Some observers have expressed the fear Russia, even in the face of military inferiority,
might test NATO’s resolve with an attack on one of the Baltic states
because a lack of commitment to Article V collective defense might
mean the United States and other NATO members would not fulfill
their treaty obligations.35

31      Ibid., 62.
32      Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” 10.
33      Ibid.
34      William C. Fuller Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914 (New York, NY: The Free Press,
1992): xv.
35      Alexander Woolfson, “Why the World Still Needs the West,” Standpoint, June 2015, http://
www.standpointmag.co.uk/features-june-2015-alexander-woolfson-the-world-still-needs-the-west
(accessed May 20, 2016).
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In fact, similar concerns were prominent during the Cold War when
analysts expressed doubts about the United States’ willingness to escalate
in the case of a Soviet attack on Europe. As Glaser noted, “the stronger
argument in this debate held that US strategy did provide an adequate
deterrent…because even a small probability of US nuclear escalation
presented the Soviets with overwhelming risks.”36 The fact that a Soviet
attack did not materialize in spite of a much more favorable military
balance indicates this argument had a lot of truth in it.
The assumption of irrationality as the basis for Russian decisionmaking in the area of defense and foreign policy can only hamper the
identification of appropriate policy responses. Certainly, measures such
as sanctions imposed on the Russian regime would be useless as their
success depends on the targets’ rational response. A more complex
assessment of Russia’s reasons for rebuilding its conventional military
force, not based implicitly or explicitly on questionable assumptions
about Russian strategic culture, is required.

Implications

As long as conventional military power retains utility as an instrument of policy, and it is seen as an important attribute of a global power,
Russia is unlikely to stop improving its capabilities. The neglect of
Russia’s armed forces throughout the 1990s resulted from the leadership’s
inability—not its principled lack of desire—to maintain a competitive
conventional military. Given the persistent importance of great power
status for Russia and the historical significance of military strength in
its self-perception as such a power, the revival of Russia’s conventional
military was just a matter of time.
This revival has implications for the global power balance and
confronts the United States and NATO with an uncomfortable reality.
Forcing Russia into reversing, or putting a stop to, this process per se
is not an option. Western sanctions banning the export of defense
technology and dual-use equipment into Russia are already in place
and should be continued. The Russian defense industry is reliant on
Western imports, especially for microelectronics and advanced production equipment, so the sanctions have the potential to slow down the
modernization process. Although Russia has implemented measures to
counter the impact of the sanctions with import substitution, according
to the British expert on the Russian defense industry Julian Cooper,
the completion of some weapons systems have already been halted or
delayed.37
The pace of further Russian military modernization will largely
depend on economic developments within the country. When the ambitious rearmament program to the year 2020 was created in 2010, the pace
of the program was based on the expectation of significant economic
growth which would allow Russia to keep defense spending below three
percent of the gross domestic product for the lifetime of the program.
Economic stagnation, however, meant military expenditures ballooned
36      Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” 85.
37      Julian Cooper, “Russia’s State Armament Program to 2020: A Quantitative Assessment of
Implementation, 2011-2015,” Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) Report, March 2016, 41, http://
www.foi.se/report?rNo=FOI-R--4239--SE (accessed June 5, 2016).
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to 5.4 percent of the gross domestic product in the amended budget for
2015, and the new armaments program was delayed until 2025.38 From
this viewpoint, much will depend on the Russian leadership’s willingness and ability to prioritize defense over other crucial areas of state
spending.
Russia is likely to continue using military force as an instrument of
policy. Better capabilities have given it a wider range of options, including outside of the former Soviet region. It is another uncomfortable
reality for the United States and for NATO—as long as the right of
states to use force persists in international politics, there is no easy way
of stopping Russia from resorting to force in certain situations.
This is the case even if Russia does so in ways deemed to go against
internationally accepted norms on when intervention is justified, as it did
in Ukraine in 2014. In this sense, the United States and NATO can only
lead by example in using military force strictly as a last resort and within
the parameters of international law and to condemn Russia when it does
not do the same. It is clear Russian military actions in Ukraine have
already had serious consequences for the country’s international image.
Negative views of Russia in Europe have risen from 54 to 74 percent and
no region of the world has improved its perspective of the country.39 As
complete isolation is not in Russia’s interest, there is hope international
repercussions and likely condemnation when international law is clearly
violated will be a factor in its future decisions to use military force.
On a more encouraging note, there are limitations to Russia resorting to the use of military force in an offensive capacity and to the
effectiveness of relying on this instrument as a means to regaining the
status of a world power. It is unlikely improved conventional capabilities
will blind the Russian leadership to the fact that military force is not a
panacea for the achievement of all policy objectives and that in certain
cases, especially if it could lead to direct confrontation with a militarily
superior actor such as NATO, this could have devastating consequences
that would not serve its interests. Although Crimea demonstrated Russia
does not in principle shy away from using military force in support of
territorial expansion, it is unlikely a “mindless lust for territory” has
become the driver for Russian defense and foreign policy. If the experience of the post-Soviet era is anything to go by, Russia has not used
military force for territorial expansion in the past, even in cases when
the opportunity presented itself—and its military power would have
allowed it to do so.
When it comes to Russia’s use of conventional military power to
re-establish itself as a serious actor in global politics, it is clear “swaggering” has already yielded considerable results. Although Russia’s relative
conventional military power is nowhere near the strength of the United
States and NATO, international reactions to the display of its revived
armed forces have arguably enhanced its global image to an extent
that far exceeds its actual material capabilities. This should be kept in
mind when decisions on US and NATO force deployments on Russia’s
38      Ibid., 51-52.
39      Mark Galeotti, “The West is Too Paranoid About Russia’s ‘Infowar’,” The Moscow Times,
June 30, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-west-is-too-paranoid-aboutrussias-infowar-op-ed/524756.html (accessed May 3, 2016).
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western borders are made. Reassurance measures, especially for NATO’s
most eastern member states, are inevitable. If the motivations for these
measures are not clearly communicated, they could potentially lead to a
situation whereby increasingly aggressive posturing by Russia could be
encouraged rather than discouraged by indirectly inflating the image of
its military power internationally and amongst the Russian population.
Reliance on conventional military power will only get Russia so far
in its quest to regain international recognition as a great power. In an
article published in 1996, Richard Pipes noted financially unattainable
ambitions for conventional military power in the 1993 Russian military
doctrine. In his view, Russia was at a crossroads between the lengthy
path of turning the country into a genuine world power that projected
strength in all areas of statecraft and the alluring shortcut towards recognition as a great power based entirely on military might.40
If Russia did indeed choose the second path, as seems probable given
recent developments, this is unlikely to serve its interests well in the long
term. The collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated the hollowness
of international status based entirely on military might. The loss of the
latter inevitably signified the loss of great power status for Russia which,
unlike the United States, had not maintained strength in other important
areas of statecraft and foreign policy.41 Although recent Russian defense
reforms cannot be compared to the defense efforts of the Soviet Union
in terms of scope and size, even comparatively modest military spending
has significantly strengthened Russia’s ability to project the image of
power on an international level. This is a double-edged sword, however.
If Russia continues to use military force in ways condemned by large
portions of the international community and neglects the development
of other instruments of statecraft for both domestic and international
use, it will isolate itself further, rather than gain the respect it craves.

NATO’s Options

NATO’s and the West’s options for stopping the ongoing revival
of Russia’s conventional military power, or to prevent potential future
Russian military interventions, are limited. There are choices to be made
in deciding how to respond to these developments, especially when it
comes to Russian military posturing vis-à-vis NATO, and potential
consequences of any responses made need to be weighed up carefully.
As indicated in NATO SACEUR Scaparotti’s May 2016 statement
and also by NATO’s actions since the start of the Ukraine conflict in
spring 2014, the alliance has decided to take an uncompromisingly tough
stance towards Russia, strengthening its presence and posture alongside
its eastern borders in order to demonstrate strength, unity, and resolve
to deter any potential Russian military aggression or expansionist move
against NATO members and allies. While these measures are likely to
reassure NATO member states in eastern and central Europe that have
been historically fearful of Russian intentions, their potential long-term
consequences for NATO and the West should not be ignored. It is already
obvious Russia is not interpreting NATO’s actions in the spirit intended
40      Pipes, “Is Russia Still an Enemy?” 78.
41      Ibid.; and Art, “American Foreign Policy,” 41.
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by the alliance, that is, as defensive measures aimed predominantly at
reassuring NATO member states close to its borders.
Continuing to perceive NATO troops stationed and exercising close
to its borders as a threat to its security and national interests, Russia has
reacted by stepping up its military posture and presence, as well as its
aggressive rhetoric vis-à-vis NATO. The experience of the Cold War
has taught us what an ever-more intense security dilemma can lead to.
If the current trend of uncompromising rhetoric and military posturing
on both sides continues, a renewed arms race is a likely outcome. Given
Russia’s economic situation and comparative conventional military
weakness, the West would probably emerge victorious yet again in such
a race. From this point of view, the scenario of a new arms race would be
less disastrous for the West than it would be for Russia, but nonetheless
it would be costly for all states and societies involved. Moreover, the
danger of intended or unintended escalation in the face of spiralling
tensions is worth bearing in mind.
Doing nothing is clearly not an alternative to NATO’s current
policies towards Russia. Even if a convincing case can be made that
Russian intentions are probably not driven by expansionist policies and
that an attack on a NATO member state is highly unlikely, chance and
uncertainty make the fears felt by Russia’s closest neighbors understandable and justified. The question is whether a middle ground between a
policy (that will inevitably lead to another arms race with all the costs
this involves), and “doing nothing” or a weak response (that could be
interpreted as “appeasement”) can be found.
The intensity of current East-West tensions cannot yet be likened
to those of the Cold War and rhetoric about a “New Cold War” is not
helpful as it “makes it harder for the West to craft realistic policies with
respect to both the Ukraine crisis and Russia generally,” as Andrew
Monaghan has argued.42 However, certain lessons from the Cold War
might be instructive, especially when it comes to NATO’s and the West’s
handling of aggressive Russian military posturing.
George F. Kennan’s Cold War doctrine of containment, with its
emphasis on strength, unity, and readiness to defend against and deter
potential Russian expansion, has already experienced a revival and is
being discussed amongst some Western leaders and within NATO as
a relevant framework for creating responses to Russia.43 As Matthew
Rojansky cautioned, there is a tendency to interpret this doctrine falsely
as an exclusively military approach. In fact, Kennan’s understanding of
containment was a complex and long-term political strategy. Focusing
on recognition of the opponent’s vulnerabilities at the same time as
strengthening the West’s capacities to find long-term solutions to pressing problems, Kennan explicitly warned against the use of “threats
or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward toughness” as this
could back the Kremlin into a corner and inadvertently exacerbate the
situation.44
42      Andrew Monaghan, A ‘New Cold War’? Abusing History, Misunderstanding Russia (London, UK:
Chatham House, May 2015), 1.
43      Matthew Rojansky, “George F. Kennan, Containment, and the West’s Current Russia
Problem,” NATO Defense College Research Division, Research Paper #127, January 2016, 6.
44      Ibid., 2 and 7.
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The intensity of current East-West tensions will make a renewed
attempt at resetting relations with Russia a much more difficult undertaking for the soon-to-be elected new US administration. The new
administration will have the opportunity to consider whether a policy of
increasingly tough military containment of Russia will serve the future
interests of the United States and NATO better than a more balanced
approach as advocated by Kennan. The latter will be the more difficult
choice because it requires a complex understanding of developments in
Russia, as well as the willingness of both sides to communicate. This
effort appears worthwhile because as Rojansky argued, it will allow the
United States and the West to strike a balance “between demonstrating
the collective political will necessary to maintain a credible deterrent,
and charting a way forward for negotiated settlement of differences,
selective cooperation, and eventual reconciliation in Russia-West relations overall.”45

45      Ibid.

